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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRESUMED GUILTY: THE USE
OF VIDEOTAPED AND CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISED
TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEX ABUSE PROSECUTIONS AND
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION-Coy v.
Iowa
INTRODUCTION
A young California physician struggles to avoid bankruptcy
and pay over $48,000 in legal fees after he is indicted for the sexual
abuse of seventeen teenaged girls following his routine physical ex-
amination of the girls. The teenagers would later admit they made
up their stories.1 In Atlanta, a well-respected television meteorolo-
gist was forced off the air after he is indicted for allegedly solicit-
ing sodomy from three young boys in a neighboring town. A jury
would acquit the weathercaster, dismissing the boys' allegations as
nothing more than a prank. Nevertheless, the weathercaster's long
career in Atlanta would be over. He would soon leave the city in
search of new employment.2
Few will argue that child sexual abuse in this country is a
growing problem. Estimates of "child mistreatment" vary greatly,
ranging from 500,000 to as much as 4.5 million cases each year.3
While an actual number may be impossible to determine, studies
agree that the number of reported cases of child sexual abuse is
increasing at an alarming rate.4 Some authorities maintain that the
number of unreported cases is more than triple the number of the
cases reported. 5 Regardless of the statistics, the problem, of child
sexual abuse has captured the attention of politicians, the media,
1. Renshaw, When Sex Abuse is Falsely Charged, 10 The Champion 8
(1986). The physician had administered routine chest and inguinal hernia exami-
nations of the girls for school sports. Even though the girls later admitted their
stories were maliciously made, the prosecution kept the physician's name in the
headlines for almost two years.
2. Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 10, 1986, at B-11, col. 2, and Dec. 18, 1986, at
C-l, col. 5.
3. ABA Guidelines for the Fair Treatment of Child Witnesses in Cases
Where Child Abuse is Alleged, at 7, (1985).
4. S. Rep. No. 123, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 1971 (1986).
5. Id. at 1970. Reasons for this underreporting range from the variations
within state statutes defining "child abuse" to the fact that child sexual abuse
often involves family members.
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and the public.
Unfortunately, this barrage of media and political attention
has led to a sort of "child abuse hysteria." 6 In response to this
problem, federal, and state lawmakers have enacted various pro-
grams funding research in the area of child abuse, and establishing
treatments centers and shelters for sex abuse victims. 7 Many of
these programs also call for improved reporting of all suspected
incidents of child sexual abuse.' This, in turn, has led many to
"rush to accuse, search, arrest and condemn" the suspected child
abuser.9
Although many cases are dismissed as unfounded,10 more and
more cases involving child sexual abuse are coming to trial.1' Pros-
ecutors and defense counsel agree that child sex abuse cases are
among the most difficult to try.12 Often the abused child is the
state's only key witness to the crime. Without this testimony, the
prosecution often fails.'" Advocates of children's rights push for
legislation to bring about hasty, more successful prosecutions of
the child sexual offender, while they call at the same time for
added protection for the child from the trauma of repeated testi-
mony as they go through the criminal justice system.' 4
In recent years, many states have passed legislation designed
to make it easier to convict those accused of child sexual abuse,
while simultaneously attempting to shield the child witness from
numerous courtroom appearances. Almost forty states now have
statutes allowing children to testify in sex abuse prosecutions via
6. Renshaw, supra note 1, at 9. The author describes the "evolution of a sex
abuse industry" with millions of dollars being spent annually on everything from
television documentaries to the manufacture of anatomically correct dolls. Even
many "Saturday morning" cartoon programs now carry sex abuse story lines.
7. S. Rep. No. 123.
8. Id.
9. Renshaw, supra note 1, at 8-10. The author describes the rash of report-
ings as a modern day "witch hunt."
10. Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting and Investigation: Policy
Guidelines for Decision Making, 22 FAM. L. Q. 1 (1980). Nationwide, approxi-
mately sixty percent of all reported incidents of child sexual abuse are
unsubstantiated.
11. Upshaw, Children on the Witness Stand, D. Mag., June 1988, 44, 46. See
also 1984 (3) JUDGES JOURNAL 1, 55. (over half of the sexual assault cases actually
go to trial).
12. Upshaw, supra note 11, at 46.
13. Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential for Secondary Victimization,
7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1 (1983). See also infra note 109, at 472.
14. See supra note 3, at 13.
[Vol. 11:381
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closed circuit television,' by the admission of videotaped testi-
mony taken prior to trial," or both.1 7 While successful at protect-
ing the child witness, these statutes present serious obstacles for
the criminal defendant in a child sexual abuse case.
This Note proposes that those statutes which permit admis-
sion of videotaped testimony and most uses of closed-circuit tele-
vised testimony violate a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to "confront his accusers."' 8 In Coy v. Iowa,"9 the United
States Supreme Court recently held that one state's practice of
shielding the defendant from the view of the child witness during
the child's testimony violated the defendant's right to confronta-
tion. 0 Following the Court's analysis, this Note discusses the vari-
ous problems arising from the use of Videotaped or closed-circuit
televised testimony. Concluding that the admission of such testi-
mony is not a constitutionally permissable substitute for face to
15. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987); HAW. R. EvID. 616 (d) (1985);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84-
A-32.4 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.00 - .30 (McKinney Supp.
1987).
16. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2035 to 2037
(1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 3511 (Supp.
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
491.675-93 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401, 402 (1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 174.227-31 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517.13 (a) (Supp. 1987);
N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(c)
(Anderson 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1986); S.C. STAT. § 16-3-
1530(G) (Law Co-op 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1987); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-116 & 37-1-609 (c) (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. § 967.04 (West
Supp. 1987).
17. See Ala. Code §§ 15-25-2 & 3 (1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251-53
(Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1346-7 (West Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-86 (g) (West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. §§ 92.53-54 (West Supp. 1987);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (b) (Burns Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3433-34
(Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15:440.01-440.6 (West Supp. 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278 § 16D
(Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1987);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-401 to 415 (Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 753
(West Supp. 1987); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 §§ 5981-88 (Purdon Supp. 1987);
TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 77-
35-15.5 (Supp. 1987); VT. R. EviD. 807 (Supp. 1986).
18. U.S. Const. Amend. VI The sixth amendment guarantees "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him."
19. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
20. Id. at 2803.
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face, physical confrontation, this Note will offer alternative solu-
tions to the problem of protecting the child witness without in-
fringing the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant.
ANALYSIS
"The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This language
comes to us on faded parchment."21 The right to confront one's
accuser is well founded in both English and American common
law, and can be traced back to early Roman law.22 Most states
which allow the use of closed-circuit or videotaped testimony do so
with the express purpose of avoiding confrontation between the
child witness and the criminal defendant.23 Under the guise of
public policy, these states have tipped the scales of justice in favor
of protecting the child witness from the trauma of a courtroom ap-
pearance. In doing so, those jurisdictions have sacrificed the de-
fendant's constitutional right to confront his accuser. Most chal-
lenges to such statutes center around interpretation and
application of the "confrontation clause" of the sixth
amendment.2'
A. The Confrontation Clause
The right to confrontation is essential in "promoting reliabil-
ity in a criminal trial. '25 Until recently, Supreme Court opinions
dealing with the confrontation clause addressed only the issue of
21. Id. at 2800, (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
22. Id.
23. At least twenty-one states stipulate that the defendant must not be seen
by the child during the child's testimony: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. See supra notes 15-17.
24. See generally State v. Jones, 367 S.E.2d 139 (N.C. App. 1988); Common-
wealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987); Miller v. State, 517
N.E.2d 64 (Ind. 1987); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987);
State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 326, 729 P.2d 1169 (1986); State v. Shepard, 197 N.J.
Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
25. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987). The Court upheld conviction
of the defendant for the sexual abuse of two minor girls, rejecting defendant's
argument that his right to confrontation was violated by his exclusion from a
competency hearing for the young witnesses.
[Vol. 11:381
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss3/4
VIDEOTAPED TESTIMONY
cross-examination or the admissibility of hearsay statements." In
California v. Green, 7 the Court listed three reasons for the sixth's
amendment's confrontation clause: first, to ensure the defendant
an opportunity to effectively cross-examine and impeach the wit-
nesses against him; second, the right to face-to-face confrontation
with the witnesses against him; and third, the importance of al-
lowing the trier of fact to observe the witness' demeanor while tes-
tifying under oath.2 8 The Green analysis raises serious questions as
to whether any statute intended to avoid actual, physical confron-
tation between the criminal defendant and the accuser can be
constitutional.29
B. The Right to Cross-Examination
Cross-examination is the "greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth."30 Cross-examination, the "functional"
portion of the confrontation clause, provides the criminal defend-
ant with the opportunity to question and impeach the testimony of
every witness against him. 1 The emphasis placed on cross-exami-
nation prevents conviction by ex parte affidavits and forces the
state to present at trial all witnesses against the defendant.3 2 Most
states uphold the constitutionality of their videotape or closed-cir-
cuit testimony statutes as long as cross-examination of the child
witness is permitted. 3
Even though many states restrict or prohibit the defendant's
presence during examination of the witness,3" the courts uphold
26. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2808, citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1963). The Court explains the reason is because of the
room for doubt created by these areas, while the language concerning face to face
confrontation is clear.
27. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
28. Id. at 157, 158.
29. See supra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
30. California, 399 U.S. at 158, quoting 5 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367, p.
29 (1940).
31. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, (1895).
32. See Graham, Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The Current State of the
Art, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 64 (1985). The Framers intended to protect the ac-
cused from the then common practice of convicting a defendant solely on the
basis of affidavits and depositions taken from unknown or unseen accusers. Refer-
ence is often made to the trial and conviction of Sir Walter Raliegh.
33. See infra note 35.
34. See supra notes 15-17.
1989]
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the statutes as long as the particular statute allows defense counsel
to question the child. 5 Several states allow at least some form of
communication between the defendant and his attorney during
cross-examination.3 6 These states uphold the constitutionality of
these statutes, in spite of the fact that it is the "traumatic" experi-
ence of cross-examination the state seeks to protect the child
from.37
Even though these statutes may meet the minimum require-
ments of confrontation established by Green,38 they seriously im-
pair a defendant's right to be an active participant in his defense.3 9
Communication between the defendant and his counsel is im-
peded, thus impeding the defendant's right to an effective cross-
examination. Even where some form of audio communication be-
tween counsel and the defendant is established4 0 the defendant is
prevented from any non-verbal or written conference with counsel
as would normally take place in an open courtroom.4 1 This limita-
tion of communication prevents the defendant from confronting
the witness even through counsel. 2
C. Face-to-Face Confrontation
"We have never doubted . ..that the Confrontation Clause
guarantees the defendant a face to face meeting with witnesses ap-
35. See supra note 24. See also State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 351, 353 S.E.2d 451
(1987); State v. Tafoya, 105 N.M. 117, 729 P.2d 1371 (Ct. App. 1986); State v.
Jeffries, 55 N.C. App. 269, 285 S.E.2d 307 (1982). But cf. Long v. State, 694
S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied 108 S. Ct. 1301 (1988).
36. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (B) (West Supp. 1987); State v. Daniels,
484 So.2d 941 (La. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc.2d 1016, 498
N.Y.S. 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
37. Arizona, Oklahoma, and Utah take this problem a step further. Video-
taped testimony of the child witness is admissable only if taken outside the pres-
ence of the defendant or counsel. See supra note 23.
38. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
39. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979). The court
suggested that the confrontation clause "contemplates the active participation of
the accused at all stages of the trial. . ." The court also noted that exclusion of
the defendant may infringe upon his right to pro se representation.
40. See supra note 36.
41. Comment, "Face-to Television Screen- to Face": Testimony by Closed-
Circuit Television in Cases of Alleged Child Abuse and the Confrontation Right,
76 KEN. L.J. 273, 290 (1987).
42. See State v. Warford, 389 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Neb. 1986).
[Vol. 11:381
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pearing before the trier of fact."4 The Supreme Court therefore
reversed the conviction of an Iowa man charged with sexually mo-
lesting two thirteen-year old girls."' At trial, a large screen was
placed between the defendant and the girls while testifying, in ac-
cordance with Iowa law.4 The screen was brought into the court-
room in full view of the jury. Once in place, the courtroom lights
were dimmed as four bright spotlights were focused on the screen,
providing the only light in the courtroom. The defendant, as a re-
sult, had only a dim view of the witnesses, while the girls view of
the defendant was completely blocked. 6
Previous court opinions which addressed the confrontation
clause requirement of "face to face confrontation," have limited
their scope to the importance of allowing the defendant to view, or
face the witnesses against him. Many states avoid this problem
by allowing the defendant to view the child witness from behind a
two-way mirror, or by watching the one-way closed-circuit broad-
cast of the child's testimony. '
The majority in Coy did not specifically rule on these statutes
permitting videotaped or. closed-circuit televised testimony.49 Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the majority, also stressed the importance
not only of the defendant facing the witnesses against him, but the
necessity of the witnesses facing the accused while testifying:
The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a wit-
ness of standing in the presence of the person the witness accuses,
since that is the very phenomenon it relies upon to establish the
potential "trauma" that allegedly justified the extraordinary pro-
43. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800, citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 26 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).
The court described the right to face to face confrontation as the "core of values"
furthered by the sixth amendment.
44. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
45. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.3 (1) (West Supp. 1985).
46. 42 CRIM. LAW REP. 4121 (1988) (description provided by Paul Papak, rep-
resenting the defendant in oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Jan. 13,
1988. According to Mr. Papak, the entire procedure created an"eerie effect" in the
courtroom).
47. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) ("... witnesses ...upon
whom he (the defendant] can look while being tried .. ").
48. See supra notes 15-17. Iowa, supra note 45 for example, requires that the
child be told the defendant is watching and can hear the testimony.
49. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J. concurring) "Nothing in today's
decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to protect child
witnesses."
1989]
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cedure in the present case. That face to face presence may, unfor-
tunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abuse child; but by the
same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal
the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that con-
stitutional protections have costs.50
The Court elaborated on the meaning of face to face confrontation
within our criminal justice system. Justice Scolia argued that it is
always more difficult to "lie about a person to his face," and that a
statement made "behind a man's back" is less believable.5 1 Thus,
face to face confrontation serves to promote increased reliability in
the testimony presented.52
Advocates of the videotape and closed-circuit testimony laws
contend true face to face confrontation is unnecessary to insure
truthfulness among child witnesses. The most common argument is
that "children do not lie about such things as sexual abuse."5 The
fact remains, however, that over sixty percent of all reported cases
of child abuse in 1986 were dismissed as unfounded.5 4 While chil-
dren may not intentionally lie, they do often enjoy fantasy, and
may at times confuse the facts with those fantasies. 5 Children,
who are placed in a stressful situation or a new environment, may
suffer from short-term memory loss or become confused by the
questioning." The child may therefore be lead into answering
questions one way or another.5 7 Children are highly susceptible to
suggestion and may often respond to a question in a manner they
50. Id. at 2802.
51. Id. at 2800 quoting Acts 25:16 "it is not the manner of the Romans to
deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers face to
face . . ."; and Shakespeare, Richard II, act 1, sc. 1 "Then call them to our pres-
ence- face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and
the accused freely speak. .. ."
52. See Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821. See also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540
(1986) (physical confrontation between parties promotes a sense of fairness).
53. Renshaw, supra note 1, at 9.
54. See supra note 10.
55. Frost, "Weird Science" and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 10 The Cham-
pion 17, 18 (1986). Some specialists point to the high number of "copy cat" re-
ports of sexual abuse among friends and playmates of alleged sexual abuse vic-
tims. The author also points to studies which indicate children are sexually aware
at much earlier ages, due to exposure to movies, television and music videos. See
also 1984(3) JUDGE'S JOURNAL 1, 55.
56. Goodman, Child Sexual Assault: Children's Memory and the Law, 40 U.
MIAMI L.R. 181, 203-204 (1985).
57. Id.
[Vol. 11:381
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believe pleases the adult." A smile from the adult may be per-
ceived by the child as the "right" answer, a frown or serious look
as "wrong."6 9 It is therefore important that the jury be allowed to
view the child witness as well as counsel during the testimony.60
D. Observation of Witness Demeanor
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the
jury and judges' ability to observe the demeanor of the witness
faced against the accused, under the pressure of cross-examina-
tion.6' Observation of the witness means more than simply hearing
the words spoken. It involves the perception of all verbal and nonr
verbal communication of the witness.62 Testimony delivered via
closed-circuit television or videotape interferes with the "relation-
ship between the attorneys, the witness and the trier of fact."6
The very nature of viewing a witness through a television monitor
limits the jury's observation of the witness. 4
Videotaped testimony is often taken in the presence of only
two or three persons: a court-appointed interviewer posing ques-
tions presented by both attorneys; a support person, such as a par-
ent or guardian; and the camera operator.6 5 Therefore, those pre-
sent in the room at the time the testimony is recorded shape the
jury's view of the witness' demeanor. The camera operator con-
trols the jury's observation of the witness' body movements, facial
expressions, or other non-verbal communications. 7 Where the
child witness' testimony may be so influenced by other persons
present during the questioning, a restriction of the jury's observa-
58. Lees-Haley, Innocent Lies, Tragic Consequences: The Manipulation of
Child Testimony, 1987(3) TiAL DIPLOMACY J. 23, 24 (1987).
59. Id.
60. Yengich, Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 443.
61. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2800 citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2668
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Yengich, supra note 46, at 445. See also Herbert v. Superior Court, 117
Cal. App.3d 661, 19 A.L.R.4th 1276, 1282 (1981).
63. Id.
64. See Hocheiser v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279 (1984).
65. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987). See gener-
ally supra notes 23, and 15-17.
66. Hocheiser, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279. The jury's perception of the witness
may be affected by the focus or angle of the camera. The camera operator has
control over when to "fade in" for a close up, or provide a full view of the witness.
67. See State v. Vess, 157 Ariz 236, 756 P.2d 333 (Ariz. App. 1988). See also
Yengich, supra note 58, at 445.
1989] 389
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tion to only the face of the child denies the defendant his right to
confrontation."8
E. Other Problems with Videotaped or Closed-Circuit Testimony
Presumption of Innocence
This country's criminal justice system rests on the principle
that the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty and
that the state must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. The notion that a defendant has done "something so
wrong" such that the court must protect his accuser by keeping the
witness out of the courtroom, away from the defendant, undercuts
the presumption of innocence."'
In Coy, counsel for the defendant argued in oral argument the
"subconscious effect" of the screening device could not be erased
merely by a judge's instruction to the jury to disregard any infer-
ence of the defendant's guilt from use of the screen.70 The Court
elected not to address the issue of prejudicial inference and re-
manded the case to the state court for consideration of whether
the error was harmless.7'
Critics of the videotape and closed-circuit testimony laws ar-
gue that the use of video technology in this manner shifts the bur-
den of proof to the defendant. 72 The jury may give extra weight to
the child testimony delivered via closed-circuit or videotape televi-
sion.73 The credibility of the witness may be "enhanced by [a] phe-
nomenom called status-conferral. ' '74 Studies indicate that some
viewers tend to perceive what they see on television as accurate.7 5
68. Hocheiser, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
69. Yengich, supra note 51, at 444, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-
364 (1970).
70. See supra note 46. See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135
(1968) (discussing the effectiveness of jury instructions against human nature).
71. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
72. Upshaw, supra note 11, at 46. Defense attorney Tom Hill, speaking at a
panel discussion sponsored by the Psychiatric Institute of Fort Worth (Texas),
testified that the prosecution in a child sexual abuse case has an "automatic edge"
because of public concern for the child "victim." Introduction of videotaped testi-
mony strengthens that edge.
73. See Hocheiser, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
74. Id. See also Graham, supra note 26, at 75. "It is recognized that the me-
dia bestows prestige and enhances the authority of an individual by legitimizing
his status." Id.
75. See Potter, Perceived Reality and the Cultivation Hypothesis, 30 J.
BROADCASTING AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA 159, 162 (1986). The author explains the
390 [Vol. 11:381
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Enhancement of witness credibility in this manner detrimentally
affects the may be as harmful to the defendant's presumption of
innocence the same as the use of physical restraints during trial.7 6
Courts traditionally have held that the use of physical re-
straints on a criminal defendant during trial affects the jury's im-
pression of the defendant's guilt or innocence." Seeing a defendant
in handcuffs, leg irons or other restraints suggests to the jury that
the defendant is "dangerous" or is "not to be trusted. ' 78 The use
of such restraints, absent a showing of necessity, has been held vio-
lative of a defendant's right to a fair trial.7 9 The same is true with
the use of video-taped or closed-circuit televised testimony. Sepa-
rating the defendant from his accusers, without a showing of neces-
sity, denies the defendant his right to a fair and impartial trial.80
F. Admission under Hearsay Exception
The defendant's rights to a fair trial and to confrontation
guaranteed under the sixth amendment are not "absolute" and
may occasionally give way to other compelling state interests.8
The "hearsay exception" to the confrontation clause was created to
permit ex parte testimony in cases where an essential witness was
unavailable to testify at trial. Admission of video-taped or closed-
circuit televised testimony is typically allowed under the hearsay
exception rule. 2 This rationale fails for two reasons.
First, many states permit admission of the videotaped deposi-
tion of the child witness only if the child remains available to tes-
tify in open court.83 These states, in effect, defeat their own pur-
"Magic Window" theory by which many viewers believe that what they see on
television as an "accurate, unbiased, complete and objective picture of the way it
is."
76. Hocheiser, 208 Cal Rptr. at 279.
77. See generally Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Gagging,
Shackling or Otherwise Physically Restraining Accused During Course of State
Criminal Trial, 90 A.L.R.3d 17, § 4, at 33 (1979).
78. Id.
79. Id at 36. The "showing of necessity" usually refers to situations where the
defendant has acted violently or has in some way threatened the witness or dis-
rupted the court. Typically, no action is taken to restrain the defendant until
after the disruptive behavior has occured.
80. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
81. See Mattox, 156 U.S. 237 (1895); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965), Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
82. See generally supra notes 15-17.
83. See ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4251-53(A) (Supp 1986); LA. REV. STAT.
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pose of protecting the child witness from the "trauma" of a
courtroom appearance. In fact, they may add to this trauma by
subjecting the child to the additional stress of having to recant
their previously recorded testimony."4
Other states attempt to avoid this problem by admitting vide-
otaped or closed-circuit testimony only if the child has been de-
clared "unavailable." under the hearsay exception rule.88 This
presents a second problem. These states allow the witness to be
declared unavailable by a statutorily created "presumption of
trauma" for child witnesses under a specified age.86 No specific
showing of necessity is required by these states before a court may
admit the child's out-of-court testimony. 7
The Supreme Court in Coy rejected this "presumption of
trauma," stating that any exception to the confrontation clause
must be "firmly . . . rooted in our jurisprudence. 8 8 A statute
"passed in 1985, [can] hardly be viewed as firmly rooted."89 At pre-
sent, no conclusive studies exist indicating that courtroom testi-
mony will be traumatic to a child, at least no more traumatic or
stressful than for any other witness. 90 A child's mere reluctance or
fear of testifying in front of the defendant should never be suffi-
ANN. §§ 15:440.01-.06 (West Supp 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TITLE 22 § 752 (West
Supp 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35.15.5(2) (Supp 1987).
84. Yengich, supra note 60. The objective of defense counsel in situations
such as this would be to impeach the child's testimony by getting a different an-
swer from the child on the stand than that on the tape.
85. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 13-37-13.1 7 13.2 (Supp 1986); S.C. STAT. § 16-3-
1530(G) (Lawyer Co-op 1986); Wis. STAT. § 967.04 (West Supp 1987).
86. Thirty-two states specify an age at which a child witness may be declared
unavilable. The majority of these states define "child" as between the ages of 10
and 17. See generally supra notes 15-17. See also infra note 90 and accompany-
ing text.
87. Id.
88. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
89. Id. (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987)).
90. Melton, Procedural Reforms to Protect Child Victim/Witnesses in Sex
Offense Proceedings, Child Sexual Abuse and the Law, A Report of the ABA Na-
tinal Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, at 194 (1984).
See also Selkin, THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE IN THE COURTROOM: A SOURCE
BOOK, at 61, (1987). But cf. Bross, Protecting Child Witnesses, Foundations of
Child Advocacy: Legal Representation of the Maltreated Child, at 117 (1987). See
also S. Rep. No. 123, supra note 4, at 1973. Children's rights advocates refer to
treatment of the child witness by the criminal justice process as "secondary
victimization."
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cient to establish the child witness as "unavailable."9 The defend-
ant's right to confrontation should not give way to exceptions
based solely on a statutorily created presumption without a spe-
cific showing of need.92
G. Alternatives to Videotaped or Closed-Circuit Testimony
Assuming arguendo that courtroom appearances may be trau-
matic to the child witness, there are other means of protecting the
child, without removing either the witness or the defendant from
the courtroom. The most practical solution is to ensure a speedy
trial in child sexual abuse cases.93 Priority docketing of cases in-
volving child victims allows the child to "get through" the experi-
ence without having to live with the fear of testifying for a long
period of time.94 This anxiety may, in fact, be more harmful to the
child than the actual testimony.95 This alternative also fulfills the
defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.9"
In addition, emphasis should be placed on the pre-trial treat-
ment of the child. Much of the commentary in support of video-
taped testimony stresses the trauma of the child repeating his or
her story over and over.97 Videotape of the child's initial interview
with a trained sex abuse therapist can serve as an effective investi-
gatory tool, to be used by prosecuting and defense counsel, as well
as the police.98
Another method of reducing the number of pre-trial inter-
views with the child witness is the formation of a multi-discipli-
nary task force, combining members of law enforcement, children's
services and the legal community. 99 This "team approach" avoids
the duplication of efforts of the various agencies, and streamlines
the investigative and judicial processes which tend to drag the
91. See People v. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d 501, -, 517 N.E. 2d 1070, 1073
(1987).
92. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
93. ABA Guidelines, supra note 3, at 1.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Bross, supra note 90, at 117.
96. ABA Guidelines, supra note 3, at 16.
97. Id. at 13. A child may be required to repeat his story four or five times
before ever going to trial. See also supra note 4, at 1973.
98. S. Rep. No. 123, supra note 4, at 1977. The Children's Justice Act of 1986
was designed in part to provide federal funding to states for the training of law
enforcement officers in interviewing techniques for child sexual abuse victims.
99. Id.
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child through repetitive and unnecessary sessions.'
Once the child is called to the witness stand, certain consider-
ations can be afforded the witness without compromising the rights
of the defendant. A trial judge maintains the discretion and au-
thority to control direct and cross-examination of the witness to
prevent repetitive or intimidating questioning."'0 A common criti-
cism from both prosecuting and defense counsel, as well as chil-
dren's rights advocates, is the treatment of the child on the stand.
Defense counsel complain of the state's leading questions. 0 2 Prose-
cutors and children's advocates in turn object to defense's "badger-
ing" the child in attempt to impeach the child's testimony. 03 One
solution to this problem is the use of a special "child interpretor,"
such as one which would be allowed for a non-English speaking or
a deaf-mute witness.10 4 Once appointed, the interpretor poses
questions submitted by both counsel, in a "language" understood
by the child, and in a less threatening manner. 0 5
Some commentators suggest the creation of special "child
courtrooms" designed to be less inhibiting to the child, such as
those that may be used in adoption or custody cases.'06 Some
states attempt to reduce the trauma to the child witness by barring
the public or the media from the courtroom during the child's tes-
timony. 0 7 This practice may, however, violate the defendant's
100. ABA Guidelines, supra note 3, at 13-14. This method of investigation
may also provide a more reliable account of the child's assault. A child may feel
the need to change his or her answers upon repeated questioning, perceiving the
repitition as an indication he or she is "saying the wrong thing." See supra notes
52-54 and accompanying text.
101. ABA Guidelines, supra note 3, at 22. The trial judge may also limit the
number of appearances required of the child, or the length of time on the stand.
See 1984 Judges Journal, supra note 53. A child may make an average of seven
courtroom appearances during a typical sex offense prosecution. Some children
may be required to remain on the stand for several hours, often for several days.
102. See Goodman, supra note 56, at 187-89.
103. Lambert, Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 449. The author
discusses the "victimization" of the child victim on the witness stand.
104. Myers, The Testimonial Competence of Children, 25 J. FAM. L. 287, 324
(1986-87). The author suggests that this interpretor may be a relative, teacher,
babysitter or even a parent, as long as the court determines the interpretor to be
capable and wholly disinterested. See State ex rel. R.R., 79 N.J. 97, 398 A.2d 76
(1979).
105. Id.
106. Selkin, supra note 90, at 61. See also Melton, supra note 90, at 188.
107. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984).
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right to an open trial.1 08
One final solution to the problem of protecting the child wit-
ness from the trauma of a courtroom appearance is simply to pre-
sent the case without introducing the child as a witness. Under
most state laws, a child may be declared unavailable because of age
or incompetency.' 0 9 If so, then the child's statements to parents,
physicians or other persons may then be admissable under the
hearsay exception rule.110 A well-planned prosecution may alleviate
the need for putting the child witness on the stand. 1
CONCLUSION
Effective prosecution is important in this country's war
against child abuse. However, in this war, constitutional protection
of the criminal defendant must remain intact."' Although the Su-
preme Court in Coy did not specifically speak to those statutes
permitting admission of videotaped or closed-circuit testimony in
child sexual abuse cases,1 ' its decision raises many serious ques-
tions as to their validity under the Confrontation Clause of the
sixth amendment. Such laws hinder the defendant's right to effec-
tive cross-examination, and the jury's ability to observe the de-
meanor of the witness on the stand. Most importantly, these stat-
utes prohibit the face to face confrontation between the defendant
and his accusers as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. '14
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, states that these
rights are "not absolute," and may give way to "compelling public
interests" such as the protection of children."1 The states, in their
efforts to address this problem, have ignored the importance of
protecting the rights of the accused.116 The Court in Coy empha-
sizes that any infringement of these rights must be "firmly
108. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). Burger,
C.J. held that the open trial was a necessary means of monitoring the judicial
process.
109. See supra note 86.
110. Bross, supra note 95, at 118.
111. Comment, Preserving the Child Sexual Abuse Victims Testimony:
Videotaping Is Not the Answer, 1987 DET. C. L. REC. 469, 502 note 190.
112. State v. In re R.C. Jr., 494 So.2d 1350, 1356 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
113. 108 S. Ct. at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. 108 S. Ct. 2798.
115. Id. at 2803.
116. Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (1986).
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rooted.'117 This Note has illustrated that the exceptions created by
the various states allowing the introduction of videotaped and
closed-circuit televised testimony do not adquately justify overrid-
ing the defendant's right to confrontation of his accusers.
The trial of one accused of child molestation is perhaps one of
the most emotional and traumatic of any criminal prosecution -not
only for the alleged victim, but for the accused as well. Even if
acquitted, the defendant may suffer irreparable damage to his rep-
utation, career and family life. "It remains a sobering example of
the lack of concern for the criminal defendant that we would rule
out a probing and thorough examination of the alleged victim/wit-
ness in such a case .. .where the stakes are [so] immeasurably
high.1 18
Charles E. Wilson, Jr.
117. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
118. Yengich, supra note 60, at 447.
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